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Adams v. Florida Power Corp. and the Trend of 
Lowering an Employer’s Burden of Proof to Rebut 
Age Discrimination Claims 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act, which opened 
the energy industry to competition and forced the Florida Power 
Corporation, once a publicly regulated utility monopoly, to 
reorganize.1 In the course of those reorganizations, the Florida 
Power Corporation terminated Wanda Adams and 117 others, all of 
whom were over forty years of age.2 The terminated employees 
formed a class and sued the Florida Power Corporation and its 
parent corporation, the Florida Progress Corporation, on a theory of 
disparate impact.3 The district court certified the class of plaintiffs, 
but later decertified it and ruled that as a matter of law, without 
making findings of fact, disparate impact cannot form a basis for 
liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).4 
Adams and her fellow employees appealed the district court’s 
decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.5 The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the ADEA 
precludes disparate impact liability. In doing so, it took a stand on an 
issue that has caused a pervasive circuit split:6 it is generally 
recognized that the ADEA prohibits disparate treatment of workers 
because of their age,7 but the federal circuits are split on whether the 
 1. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 2. Id.; Glen Elsasser & Judy Peres, High Court to Mull Age Bias in Layoffs, CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. 4, 2001, at 11. 
 3. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1323. For an explanation of the meaning of the terms 
“disparate impact” and “disparate treatment,” as used in this Note, see infra Part II.B. 
 4. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1323–24. This is a condensed version of the facts and only 
contains those facts essential to understanding the case. The district court’s opinion is 
unpublished. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623 
(2000). 
 5. Id. at 1323. 
 6. Id. at 1324–25. 
 7. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (“The disparate 
treatment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the language of that statute makes 
clear.”). 
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ADEA prohibits disparate impact as well.8 The issue is crucial: 
whether plaintiffs seeking relief under a theory of disparate impact 
can recover for age discrimination will have a serious effect on the 
scope of the ADEA, which will likely be increasingly litigated as 
more workers continue to work past retirement age.9
This Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that 
the ADEA precludes disparate impact claims, but that the court’s 
analysis illuminates a judicial tendency to dilute the ADEA’s 
reasonable factors test. In the past, that trend had been perpetuated 
by applying Title VII’s tripartite burden-shifting scheme10 to ADEA 
cases, but the Adams decision dilutes the reasonable factors test by 
analogizing between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act (EPA). 
However it is accomplished, such a dilution makes it easier for 
allegedly infringing employers to justify their actions and is in 
contravention of Congress’s intent in enacting the ADEA. The 
Eleventh Circuit should have instead relied on an alternative plain 
language argument—presented in this Note—to resolve the claims of 
the terminated Florida Power Corporation employees. Part II of this 
Note provides background into the ADEA’s pertinent provisions and 
the definition of disparate impact. Part III outlines the history of 
disparate impact vis-à-vis the ADEA and explains the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Adams. Part IV identifies the accepted judicial 
application of Title VII burden-shifting to the ADEA—an 
application that, in some instances, may allow employers to escape 
discrimination liability without meeting the statutory requirement to 
 8. For cases holding that the ADEA permits disparate impact liability, see Criley v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 
114 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1997); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Local 350, 998 
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000). For 
cases holding that the ADEA precludes disparate impact liability, see Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 
164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 
1995); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 
(7th Cir. 1994); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 9. A recent study indicated that 69 percent of workers in the current workforce plan on 
working past retirement. Hire Consulting Services, Survey: Majority of Workers Won’t Quit at 
65, in THE HIRE REPORT, at http://www.hireconsultant.com/HireReport3.htm (last visited 
Sep. 23, 2002). This trend has resulted in an increase in complaints filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. Michele Himmelberg, Age-based Complaints on the 
Rise, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, July 30, 2002, http://www.ocregister.com/archive/ 
(“Age-discrimination complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
increased 13 percent in 2000 and rose almost 9 percent last year [2001] to 17,405.”). 
 10. See infra Part IV.A for an explanation of Title VII’s tripartite burden-shifting 
scheme. See also infra Part IV.C.1 for a history of that scheme. 
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show that the allegedly discriminatory employment action was based 
on reasonable factors other than age, thereby diluting the ADEA’s 
reasonable factors test. Part IV will also show how the Eleventh 
Circuit demonstrated this judicial tendency to weaken the ADEA’s 
reasonable factors defense by analogizing between the ADEA and 
the EPA,11 as well as how that analogy may illustrate a new rationale 
for lowering a defendant employer’s burden of proof. Diluting the 
ADEA’s reasonability requirement to any degree beyond that 
evinced in the Act’s statutory language is impermissible because it 
makes it easier for allegedly infringing employers to defend 
themselves against the discrimination liability that Congress intended 
them to face; in cases where plaintiff employees do not have 
sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant’s proffered reasons 
for its allegedly discriminatory action are pretextual, a defendant can 
escape liability without the statutorily-required showing of 
reasonable factors other than age. The burden-shifting scheme that 
has produced this result is inapplicable in ADEA contexts, and 
reducing an employer’s burden by any means allows employers to 
escape liability in situations where Congress likely intended them to 
face liability. Part V argues that the Eleventh Circuit could have 
avoided participating in the trend to dilute the ADEA’s reasonability 
requirement simply by considering the ADEA’s plain language; Part 
V presents the plain language argument that the Eleventh Circuit 
should have used and demonstrates how that analysis solves the 
question at bar without needlessly diluting the ADEA’s reasonability 
requirement. A plain language analysis yields a conclusion consistent 
with Supreme Court statements on the issue, the congressionally-
stated purpose of the ADEA, and the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion 
that Title VII and the ADEA are not analogous,12 and would 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000). The Equal Pay Act provides, in pertinent part, that: 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall 
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, 
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such 
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the 
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . . except where such payment is made 
pursuant to . . . (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex. 
Id. (emphasis added). See infra Part IV.B for an explanation of the analogy the Eleventh 
Circuit employed. 
 12. Proponents of allowing disparate impact liability under the ADEA have pointed to 
cases holding that disparate impact liability is available under Title VII and that the prohibitory 
language of Title VII and the ADEA is the same; therefore, the ADEA must also allow 
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preserve the Adams court’s correct analysis of those issues. Part VI 
offers conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
The ADEA13 protects workers over forty years of age14 and 
prohibits three principal groups from engaging in age discrimination: 
employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations.15 
According to section 623(a), employers may not fire, refuse to hire, 
or discriminate against any employee by paying that employee less or 
by providing inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
because of that employee’s age; additionally, employers may not 
disparate impact liability. See infra Part III.A. To illustrate, note for example that the ADEA’s 
prohibition against age discrimination by an employer makes it illegal for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age; or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter. 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(3) (2000). Likewise, Title VII makes it unlawful 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000). See infra Part V.D for an explanation of why Title VII 
and the ADEA are in fact not analogous. 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 623. The ADEA is a detailed system of rules; this section will therefore 
discuss only those rules most pertinent to an analysis of disparate impact theory under the 
ADEA. 
 14. Id. § 631(a) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who 
are at least 40 years of age.”). Though the ADEA protects workers of over forty years of age, it 
“does not provide a remedy for reverse age discrimination,” i.e., discrimination based on the 
youth of an employee, rather than old age. Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c). For additional expositions of the ADEA’s prohibitions, see 
Kay H. Hodge, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, SG060 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 337, 340–
41 (2002); Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Disparate Impact, Disparate Treatment, and the Displaced 
Homemaker, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (Autumn 1986). 
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segregate or classify any employee in any way because of that 
employee’s age that would adversely affect that employee, nor can 
they reduce the wages of younger employees in order to mask a 
discriminatory discrepancy between younger and older employees’ 
wages.16
Section 623(f) of the ADEA sets forth categories of permissible 
employment practices which would otherwise be impermissible if not 
explicitly sanctioned.17 First, it permits employers to engage in what 
would otherwise be discriminatory behavior so long as “age is a bona 
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the particular business.”18 Second, and most important 
for purposes of this Note, it allows employers to differentiate 
between employees “based on reasonable factors other than age.”19 
Third, it also allows employers to violate the ADEA’s provisions if 
compliance with the Act would be illegal in the country where the 
workplace is located, if a foreign country.20 Employers may also 
observe a bona fide seniority system21 or employee benefit plan,22 
even if such systems or plans violate the ADEA.23 
B. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Defined 
Disparate impact claims “involve employment practices that are 
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified 
by business necessity.”24 The United States Supreme Court has held 
that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a 
disparate-impact theory.”25 For example, a disparate impact claim 
might challenge a policy to require a job applicant’s birthdate; that 
policy may not have as its purpose the weeding out of older 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(3). 
 17. For further reading on the ADEA’s prohibitions, see Hodge, supra note 15, at 341–
42; Yarbrough, supra note 15, at 110–11. 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. § 623(f)(2)(A). 
 22. Id. § 623(f)(2)(B). 
 23. Id. § 623(f)(2). For an additional enumeration of defenses provided for under the 
ADEA, see Hodge, supra note 15, at 341–42. 
 24. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 25. Id. 
BRO-FIN 9/29/2003 10:36 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1102 
 
applicants, but it may deter older employees from applying for the 
job or, at a minimum, cause an unsuccessful applicant to believe that 
she was not hired because of her age.26 In that circumstance, the 
plaintiff employee would not need to demonstrate that the employer 
intended to discriminate against older applicants; she would only 
need to prove that the employer’s policy “more harshly” impacted 
older applicants. 
Disparate treatment, on the other hand, is intentional 
discrimination. It occurs when an employer purposefully 
discriminates in her employment decisions on the basis of the 
employee’s race, gender, religion, or some other characteristic.27 In a 
disparate treatment claim, therefore, a plaintiff must demonstrate the 
defendant employer’s discriminatory intent. In contrast to a disparate 
impact claim, which argues that an otherwise facially neutral 
employment policy impacts one class of workers more harshly than 
another, a disparate treatment claim would, for example, claim that 
an employee had been terminated because of sex or race.28 In a 
disparate impact claim, those characteristics are incidental to the 
discrimination; in a disparate treatment claim, those characteristics 
are the reason for the discrimination. 
 26. Michael Faillace, Current Employment Law Issues, 687 PRACTISING L. INST./PAT. 
205, 211 (2002) (noting that “while asking for [an] applicant’s date of birth does not in and 
of itself violate the statute, such a request may tend to either deter older applicants or could 
permit a discriminatory inference of age discrimination if the applicant is not hired”). 
 27. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (noting that disparate treatment occurs when 
“[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, 
color, religion [or other protected characteristics]” and that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive 
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in 
treatment”); see also Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 
1988) (noting that a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment must show discriminatory motive as 
well as disparate treatment but that the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment by simply presenting evidence of disparate treatment). For more reading on the 
difference between a disparate impact claim and a disparate treatment claim, including 
evidentiary standards, see Laina Rose Reinsmith, Note, Proving an Employer’s Intent: Disparate 
Treatment Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine After Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, 55 VAND. L. REV. 219, 224–39 (2002). 
 28. See, e.g., Nanda v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 303 F.3d 817, 819, 830 n.6 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that a doctor claimed, under a disparate treatment theory, that she had 
been terminated from her employment as an assistant professor of microbiology because of her 
sex, race, and national origin). 
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III. THE ADAMS DECISION: OUTLINING AND TAKING A STAND ON 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. How the Circuit Split Arose 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Adams v. Florida Power Corp. 
maps out the path that disparate impact theory took in integrating 
itself into ADEA jurisprudence.29 That path began with two United 
States Supreme Court decisions. In 1971, the Court decided Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co.,30 which held that disparate impact in employment 
discrimination was a cognizable injury under Title VII.31 Then, in 
1978, the Court decided Lorillard v. Pons,32 which pointed out that 
the language of Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination mirrors 
that of the ADEA; specifically, the Court noted that “the 
prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title 
VII.”33 Taken together, those decisions seem to say that disparate 
impact liability is available under the ADEA; if disparate impact 
liability is available under Title VII, and the prohibitory language of 
the ADEA mirrors that of Title VII, then the ADEA must also 
permit disparate impact liability. 
Twenty-two years after Griggs, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,34 
the Supreme Court attacked the notion that disparate impact was a 
cognizable injury under the ADEA, but not in a way that would 
provide clear guidance to other courts deciding that issue. Hearing 
the case of an ADEA-covered employee who was terminated 
immediately before his pension benefits vested,35 the Court noted 
that “[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the essence of what 
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA,”36 and that “[w]hen the 
employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age, 
the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears. 
 29. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 31. Id. at 431; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982) (noting that 
the “legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII” shows that “Congress 
recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact analysis employed by the Court in Griggs”). 
 32. 434 U.S. 575 (1978). 
 33. Id. at 584. See supra note 12 for a brief explanation of Title VII’s relevance to this 
Note’s argument, as well as the relevant text of both the ADEA and Title VII. 
 34. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 35. Id. at 606–07. 
 36. Id. at 610. 
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This is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with 
age . . . .”37 Also, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted 
that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over 
disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA.”38 On their 
face, these statements seem to conclusively demonstrate that the 
Court believed disparate impact to have no place in ADEA 
jurisprudence, but the majority explicitly noted that Hazen Paper 
was a disparate treatment case, not a disparate impact case, and that 
the Court had “never decided whether a disparate impact theory of 
liability is available under the ADEA” and that it would not do so in 
deciding Hazen Paper.39 In addition, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
explained that “nothing in the Court’s opinion should be read as 
incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called ‘disparate impact’ 
theory of Title VII.”40 As such, even though the Court seems to 
believe that disparate impact has no place in ADEA jurisprudence, 
there is considerable doubt as to whether Hazen Paper is a disparate 
impact case at all. 
Two perspectives therefore result. One perspective relies on the 
similarity in language between the ADEA and Title VII and the fact 
that the Hazen Paper Court explicitly refused to invalidate that 
argument. The other perspective relies on the Hazen Paper dicta to 
argue that disparate impact liability has no place in ADEA 
jurisprudence. Those two conflicting perspectives caused a split in 
the circuits. The Eleventh Circuit in Adams noted that “[t]he 
Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have read [the language in 
Hazen specifying that the Supreme Court does not decide whether 
disparate impact may form a basis for liability under the ADEA] 
literally and continue to allow disparate impact claims.”41 However, 
the “First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have questioned 
the viability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA post-
Hazen.”42 These cases rely both on the Hazen Paper majority 
opinion and concurring statements.43
 37. Id. at 611. 
 38. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 610. 
 40. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 41. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001); see supra note 8 
for cases holding that the ADEA permits disparate impact liability. 
 42. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1324–25; see supra note 8 for cases holding that the ADEA 
precludes disparate impact liability. In Adams, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly names the Sixth 
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B. The Reasoning in Adams44
After presenting the history of disparate impact in the ADEA 
context and outlining the circuit split on that issue, the court in 
Adams went on to reject the claim that disparate impact can form 
the foundation for a claim under the ADEA. In doing so, the 
Eleventh Circuit relied on the plain language of the ADEA, its 
legislative history, and an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
Hazen Paper decision. 
The court began by addressing whether Title VII and the ADEA 
are analogous. Specifically, the court cites as a key difference section 
623(f)(1) of the ADEA, which explains that “[i]t shall not be 
unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited 
under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section . . . where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age . . . .”45 
Title VII contains no such provision, so this language must be read 
to preclude disparate impact from the scope of the ADEA; if not, “it 
becomes nothing more than a bromide to the effect that ‘only age 
discrimination is age discrimination,’” producing “a circular 
construction” that would render the provision superfluous.46
The court argues that this language is more similar to that found 
in the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits gender-based wage 
discrimination unless the discriminatory result is “based on any other 
factor other than sex.”47 The court then cites County of Washington 
v. Gunther, in which the Supreme Court held that the Equal Pay Act 
precludes disparate impact claims,48 and argues that if the two 
provisions are linguistically similar, and the EPA precludes disparate 
impact, then the ADEA must preclude disparate impact as well. 
Circuit as one that has questioned whether disparate impact is available under the ADEA. The 
Sixth Circuit, although recognizing that “[t]here is considerable doubt as to whether a claim 
of age discrimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory,” has actually “stated that a 
disparate-impact theory of age discrimination may be possible.” Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 53 
F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 43. The Adams decision also mentions that these circuits have relied on “other factors” 
in deciding against applying disparate impact theory to the ADEA. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325. 
 44. For a synopsis of the facts in Adams, see supra Part I. 
 45. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000)). 
 46. Id. (quoting Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 47. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv)). 
 48. Id. (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170–71 (1981)). 
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After holding, through these comparisons, that the ADEA 
precludes disparate impact, the court goes on to note that the 
ADEA’s legislative history further distinguishes it from Title VII. 
The court cites a report, issued by the Secretary of Labor before the 
ADEA was adopted, on age discrimination.49 That report, according 
to the court, “recommended that Congress ban arbitrary 
discrimination, such as disparate treatment based on stereotypical 
perceptions of the elderly, but that factors affecting older workers, 
such as policies with disparate impact, [should] be addressed in 
alternative ways.”50 That report was key in the drafting of the ADEA. 
As such, the ADEA’s legislative history differs from that of Title VII, 
which did not have as its policy the suppression of stereotypes and 
should not be compared.51
Finally, the court admits that the Hazen Paper decision did not 
explicitly address disparate impact under the ADEA, but contends 
that the Supreme Court’s language in that decision hints that the 
Court is inclined to preclude disparate impact from the ADEA. First, 
the court cites to the Hazen Paper Court’s observation that disparate 
treatment (and by inference, not disparate impact) is the “essence” 
of the ADEA’s prohibition.52 Second, the court points out that the 
Hazen Paper Court noted that disparate impact “[does] not rely on 
‘inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes’”—the problem the ADEA 
sought to remedy—and therefore does not fall within the ambit of 
the ADEA.53 The majority therefore affirmed the district court’s 
ruling against plaintiffs that disparate impact cannot form the basis of 
an ADEA claim. 
 49. Id. at 1325–26. 
 50. Id. (citing Mullin, 164 F.3d at 702–03; Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 
1008 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 51. See 29 U.S.C. § 621. Congress’s findings of fact included findings that older 
workers are “disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment” because of increased 
affluence; that employers commonly set arbitrary age limits; that unemployment is higher 
among older workers than it is among younger workers; and that arbitrary discrimination 
affects commerce. Id. Its stated purpose in enacting the ADEA was to “promote employment 
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination 
in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising 
from the impact of age on employment.” Id. There is no statement concerning the suppression 
of stereotypes. 
 52. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 
(1993)). 
 53. Id. (quoting Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611). 
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In her concurrence, Judge Barkett joins with the majority’s 
holding, but on the ground that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not 
plead “a disparate impact claim sufficient to qualify for class 
certification”; she therefore argues that it is unnecessary in this case 
to decide whether disparate impact is a viable basis for liability under 
the ADEA.54 That said, she proceeds to argue that disparate impact 
may act as a basis of ADEA liability, taking the position advocated by 
the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits: that the Hazen Paper Court 
explicitly refused to decide whether disparate impact may form a 
basis for ADEA liability, therefore making any language to the 
contrary inapposite;55 that section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA does not 
bar disparate impact from the ADEA, but rather constitutes a 
statutory manifestation of the commonly accepted business necessity 
defense;56 that the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA are really not 
analogous;57 and that the legislative history does not in fact betray an 
intent to exclude disparate impact from ADEA jurisprudence.58
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Adams relied 
upon several distinct lines of reasoning. First, it conducted a faux 
plain language analysis and reasoned that Title VII and the ADEA 
are not analogous and that the ADEA is, in fact, more analogous to 
the Equal Pay Act—a provision which, the Supreme Court has held, 
does not allow disparate impact theories. It then reasoned that the 
ADEA’s legislative history indicates a congressional intent to remove 
disparate impact from the purview of the ADEA. Finally, it reasoned 
that in Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court manifested its inclination to 
reject disparate impact claims under the ADEA. As will be 
demonstrated in the remainder of this Note, the court’s conclusions 
with respect to Title VII, the ADEA’s legislative history, and the 
 54. Id. (Barkett, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 1329 (Barkett, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 1327 (Barkett, J., concurring). The business necessity defense allows a 
defendant employer to defend herself against a discrimination action by showing that the 
employment decision in controversy was related to employment and justified by a business 
necessity. See Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose By Any Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet: 
Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 530, 576–79 (1996) (explaining the business necessity defense). 
 57. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1328–29. Judge Barkett noted that the remedial provisions of 
the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act are analogous, but the substantive provisions, which were 
the proper focus of the court’s analysis in Adams, are not. Id. Also, the Equal Pay Act requires 
a neutral explanation, not a presentation of “reasonable factors” as required by the ADEA. For 
an explanation of the difference this makes in the Adams majority’s analysis, see infra Part IV. 
 58. Id. at 1330–31. 
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Supreme Court’s statements were all correct; its analogy between the 
ADEA and the Equal Pay Act, however, could prove disastrous for 
future disparate treatment plaintiffs. 
IV. HOW THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ILLUMINATED THE JUDICIAL 
TENDENCY TO DILUTE THE ADEA’S REASONABLE FACTORS 
EXCEPTION 
The Eleventh Circuit correctly held that the ADEA precludes 
disparate impact claims and provided a correct answer to the circuit 
split,59 but its analysis is dangerous to future disparate treatment 
plaintiffs. Its analogy between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act was 
designed to show that because the ADEA is linguistically akin to the 
Equal Pay Act—a statute that the Supreme Court has held to 
preclude disparate impact—the ADEA should be similarly construed. 
Its result, however, may be to articulate an interpretation of the term 
“reasonable,” as used in the ADEA, so as to make it inordinately 
difficult for disparate treatment plaintiffs to successfully sue 
discriminating employers. If this is indeed the result of the analogy, 
then Adams would conform to a long line of cases that improperly 
dilute the term “reasonable.” 
This Part will first analyze the tripartite burden-shifting scheme 
currently applied in ADEA cases and demonstrate that, in some 
cases, the scheme may significantly reduce the burden of proof a 
defendant must meet to rebut a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. It will then analyze the Eleventh Circuit’s analogy 
between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act and show how the 
analogy also reduces a defendant’s burden of proof, although 
through a different means; this illustrates a judicial trend, manifested 
in at least two ways, of limiting a defendant’s burden of proof. This 
Part will then present two reasons why diluting the ADEA’s 
reasonability requirement is improper. First, cases applying the 
tripartite burden-shifting scheme to ADEA cases rely on unfounded 
reasoning. Second, diluting the reasonable factors exception is 
inconsistent with Congress’s intent in passing the ADEA. 
 59. The argument that the Eleventh Circuit reached the correct result will be presented 
infra Part V. That Part will argue that a plain language analysis—the more appropriate analysis 
in this case—reaches the same result. 
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A. The Trend of Reducing a Defendant Employer’s Burden of Proof 
Courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have departed from the 
plain language of the ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than age” 
test by applying Title VII’s tripartite burden-shifting to ADEA cases. 
That burden-shifting scheme is tripartite in nature.60 First, an ADEA 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case.61 A plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case by demonstrating (1) that she was at least forty years 
old at the time of termination; (2) that she was terminated; (3) that 
she was meeting the defendant employer’s reasonable expectations of 
employee performance at the time of the termination; and (4) that 
she was replaced by a younger employee.62 Once the plaintiff 
establishes that prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts 
to the employer, who must defend by presenting evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory 
action.63 According to the Eleventh Circuit, “a legally sufficient, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason [exists] if the defendant 
 60. See O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1996) 
(applying Title VII burden-shifting to an ADEA case). 
 61. Id. at 310. 
 62. See Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2003). But see 
O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312 (noting that a requirement that a terminated worker be replaced 
by someone under forty years of age is irrelevant to the proper analysis: “[t]he fact that one 
person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is . . . 
irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age”). 
 63. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311. This Note will assume that a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” is synonymous with a “reasonable factor other than age.” That 
assumption, however, is only for purposes of simplifying the Note’s argument. See infra note 
70 for some explanation of why the two standards may in fact not be synonymous. Whatever 
the term used, it seems that a defendant employer would have two opportunities to invoke that 
defense. First, a defendant may move to dismiss a claim based on legitimate but 
nondiscriminatory reasons, or reasonable factors, on the ground that it fails to state a claim 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)—that it is, in fact, a disparate impact 
claim for which the ADEA grants no remedy. Second, a defendant may invoke such reasons or 
factors to rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case. The obvious difference is that the former situation 
awards dismissal based solely on the pleadings, while the latter is an affirmative defense granted 
after the production of at least some evidence. See Mayer, 318 F.3d at 807 (noting that once a 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a defendant employer “must then produce evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for terminating plaintiff). No matter which term is used, 
these are a defendant’s opportunities to take the case out of the scope of disparate treatment 
and place it in the netherworld of disparate impact; the two phrases, though different, would 
fulfill the same procedural role. This Note argues simply that the phrase “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” should be replaced with the phrase “reasonable factors other than 
age”—that an employer should be required to produce reasonable reasons rather than 
legitimate reasons as defined herein. See supra Part V.A. 
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articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which it 
based its subjective opinion.”64 A defendant employer meets its 
burden when the admissible “evidence raises a genuine issue of fact 
as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff with clear reasons 
for its decision;”65 evidence, not mere testimony, must be presented 
to meet that burden.66 If the defendant remains silent, the court will 
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law;67 
presumably, the same result obtains if, for some reason, the 
defendant cannot meet its burden. But if the defendant meets its 
burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason set forth by the defendant is a 
pretext.68
This burden-shifting scheme is, in some cases, fundamentally 
inconsistent with the ADEA’s requirement that a defendant 
employer defend itself by producing “reasonable factors other than 
age” for its employment decision. As noted, once the defendant 
employer presents evidence sufficient to shift its burden, the plaintiff 
then must show that the reasons the defendant proffered for its 
allegedly discriminatory action are pretextual. There are clearly some 
situations where the defendant can present irrefutable evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and rightly avoid liability. 
However, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s 
reasons are pretextual, then it follows that the reasons the defendant 
proffered were plainly never reasonable, for a proffered reason cannot 
be both pretextual and reasonable.69 The tripartite burden-shifting 
scheme thus, in some cases, inherently allows the burden to shift 
back to the plaintiff even though the defendant has presented 
something less than a reasonable factor other than age, as required 
by the ADEA. So long as the defendant presents evidence that raises 
 64. Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotations 
omitted) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1033 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 65. Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 254–55 (1981)). 
 66. Id. at 1075 (noting that a “defendant may not satisfy this burden by mere 
argument, but must present evidence of the legitimate reason for its decision”). 
 67. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311. 
 68. Mayer, 318 F.3d at 807. 
 69. Dishonesty is inherent in a pretext, which is defined as “[a] false or weak reason or 
motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
967 (abridged 7th ed. 2000). In contrast, something that is reasonable is fair or proper under 
the circumstances. See id. at 1018. 
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an issue of fact, the burden will shift. The ADEA-mandated showing 
of reasonableness is not required, but rather a showing of facts that 
might bear on the employer’s decision.70
Of course, the plaintiff will sustain no injury if she can rebut the 
defendant’s proffered reasons. Conversely, though, the plaintiff will 
be severely injured in instances where she has enough evidence to 
assert a prima facie case, but not enough evidence to rebut the 
defendant’s pretext. As noted, in order to present a prima facie case, 
a plaintiff must show that she was over forty years old, that she was 
terminated, that she was meeting the defendant employer’s 
reasonable employment expectations, and that the plaintiff was 
replaced by someone younger.71 Those four factors require very little 
in the way of evidence: age and termination are easy to prove, as is 
the age of replacement workers, and a plaintiff can demonstrate that 
she was meeting the defendant’s reasonable expectations by 
proffering easily obtainable performance review records. Proving a 
pretext, however, requires a considerably higher showing of 
evidence: the plaintiff must show that she was the “victim of 
intentional discrimination by showing that the employer’s proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence.”72 To say that a reason for 
terminating an employee is pretextual is to say that, even though the 
reason might be valid, the employer was looking for an excuse to 
terminate an older employee and that it used that reason as an 
excuse. Employees may not be able to meet such a high burden, and 
therefore their ADEA claims may fail even if the defendant employer 
does not present evidence of a reasonable factor other than age.73
 70. Consequently, the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” and “reasonable factor 
other than age” tests might not be synonymous. If the presentation of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for an employer’s action requires only the presentation of evidence 
sufficient to raise an issue of fact, it clearly does not rise to the level of reasonableness required 
by the ADEA. Reasonableness would per se preclude a plaintiff from proving that the proffered 
reason is a pretext because something that is reasonable is not pretextual. See id. at 967. 
However, the presentation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, as defined as a showing 
of an issue of material fact, obviously produces some pretexts—otherwise, the tripartite 
burden-shifting scheme would not allow the defendant to foist its burden on the plaintiff to 
show pretext. 
 71. See supra note 62. 
 72. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quotations 
omitted). 
 73. Note that courts would not place too great a burden on the plaintiffs by requiring 
them to prove that their employers’ proffered reasons are pretextual. Just as defendants should 
not be able to escape liability by proffering something less than a reasonable factor other than 
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Such a situation arose in the Eleventh Circuit in Walker v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.74 In that case, the 
plaintiffs claimed that they were passed up for a job on the basis of 
their age and gender.75 The Eleventh Circuit assumed that a prima 
facie case existed with respect to at least one of the employers that 
decided not to offer the plaintiffs a job,76 and the defendant 
employer sought to rebut this prima facie case by setting forth 
evidence demonstrating that the candidate the defendant in fact 
hired was more qualified than the plaintiffs.77 The plaintiffs sought to 
rebut defendant’s reasons by arguing that they were more qualified 
than the candidate actually hired and that the defendant had 
deviated from its hiring practices.78 The Eleventh Circuit then 
articulated an extraordinarily high burden for the plaintiffs to meet in 
order to rebut the defendant’s proffered reasons and prove that they 
were more qualified than the candidate that was actually hired: the 
court required plaintiffs to “show more than superior qualifications; 
rather, they must show that they were so much more qualified that 
the disparity virtually jumps off the page and slaps one in the face.”79 
The court found that the plaintiffs did not meet that burden.80 
Similarly, though the court cited no explicit standard governing the 
pretextuality of hiring procedures, the plaintiffs were nevertheless 
unable to prove that hiring procedures were not satisfied; the court 
held that evidence showing that the job opening was not posted was 
not sufficient to rebut the employer’s proffered reasons because the 
defendant testified that a decision to post was left to the discretion of 
the human resources department and that the opening arose so late 
age, employees should not be able to recover if they do not have sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that their employer discriminated against them because of their age. It is beyond 
the scope of this Note to articulate a preferable procedure for adjudicating ADEA claims, but a 
system that allowed plaintiffs to prove affirmatively at the outset that their employer 
discriminated against them because of their age, and then shifted the burden to the defendants 
to articulate reasonable factors other than age as an affirmative defense, would solve this 
problem. Under such a scheme, both the plaintiff and the defendant would be required to 
make their respective arguments with the maximum possible quantum of evidence. 
 74. 286 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 75. Id. at 1273. 
 76. Id. at 1276. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1277. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1278. 
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in the hiring process that there was no time to post.81 Tellingly, there 
was no evidence of how long it actually took to post a job 
opening82—evidence that might have been helpful in proving that 
the defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual. It is irrelevant to 
the analysis of this Note whether the defendant’s proffered reasons 
were actually pretextual; they very well could have been, but the 
plaintiffs had virtually no hope of even rebutting that potential 
pretext because of the high burden to which they were held.83 With 
such a high burden of proof placed upon the plaintiffs, the defendant 
could have proffered a pretext and succeeded,84 so long as its 
proffered reasons created an issue of material fact. 
Use of the tripartite burden-shifting scheme, as taken from the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme,85 predates Adams in the 
Eleventh Circuit86 and is in wide usage in virtually all the circuit 
courts of appeal.87 As such, it is the generally accepted application (or 
misapplication) of the ADEA’s reasonable factors test, in spite of its 
elimination of the reasonable factors exception in some instances; it 
is also the trend to which the Eleventh Circuit in Adams 
conformed.88
 81. Id. at 1279. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Admittedly, this problem might occur in any Title VII case; indeed, in given 
situations  plaintiffs might not have enough evidence to prove that the reasons being proffered 
by the defendants are pretextual. The difference between the application of a burden-shifting 
scheme in Title VII and the ADEA is that the ADEA specifically mandates that employers 
present evidence of “reasonable factors other than age” as part of their affirmative defense; 
Title VII contains no such requirement. See infra Part V.D. 
 84. For obvious reasons, it will be difficult to find a case that makes clear that this has 
happened; the crux of this analysis is the potential of undetected pretexts. For that reason, it is 
sufficient for the purposes of this argument to demonstrate situations in which it could have 
happened. 
 85. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 86. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1033 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 87. Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 78 (2d Cir. 2001); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 
308 F.3d 335, 338 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 314 F.3d 
657, 663 (4th Cir. 2003); Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 
2002); Wexler v. White’s Furniture, Inc., 2003 WL 169763, at *21 (6th Cir. 2003); Nawrot 
v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2002); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 
F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying the McDonnell Douglas approach); Garrett v. Hewlett 
Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002); Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
310 F.3d 758, 761–62 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 88. A simple scheme that would allow a defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case would conform more completely with the text of the ADEA. Under that scheme, an 
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B. How the Eleventh Circuit’s ADEA/Equal Pay Act Analogy Fits into 
this Trend 
The majority in Adams analogized between the ADEA and the 
Equal Pay Act in an attempt to demonstrate that because the two 
provisions had similar language, and the Equal Pay Act precludes 
disparate impact, the ADEA must preclude disparate impact as well.89 
There is a serious flaw in that analysis, however, that further hints at 
a judicial tendency to dilute the ADEA’s reasonable factors 
exception. The Equal Pay Act permits gender discrimination if based 
on a factor other than gender.90 The ADEA grants a similar provision 
to employers with regard to age discrimination, but requires that the 
employer present reasonable factors other than age to justify her 
actions, rather than simply neutral factors.91 The analogy likely 
achieves its intended result—to show that the ADEA precludes 
disparate impact—but it may also have another result: to dilute the 
meaning of the word “reasonable” as used in the ADEA. If the 
Equal Pay Act and the ADEA are linguistically similar, and the Equal 
Pay Act requires only a neutral factor, then it follows that the term 
“reasonable” may have little or no substantive meaning. Such an 
argument may at first seem speculative at best, but the text of the 
Adams opinion unfortunately bears it out. 
In footnote six to its decision, pertaining to its ADEA/Equal Pay 
Act analogy, the Eleventh Circuit specifically recognizes the 
difference between the “neutral factor” and “reasonable neutral 
factor” language, as well as the possibility that the difference could 
distinguish the two provisions and render the analogy ineffective.92 
The court concludes, however, that the difference is not sufficient to 
preclude its analogy.93 In making this determination, the court 
implicitly questions the difference between a “reasonable factor” and 
a mere “factor” and concludes that the difference is at least minimal 
enough for its analogy to proceed. If the difference between the two 
provisions is so minimal, then it follows that the term “reasonable,” 
employer defendant would have an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case; if the 
defendant could not, she would lose, but if so, she would successfully avoid liability. 
 89. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 90. See supra note 11 for the text of the Equal Pay Act. 
 91. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 92. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325 n.6. 
 93. Id. 
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in the court’s eyes, has no real substantive meaning. As such, the 
court has suggested an interpretation of the term “reasonable” that 
substantially limits its meaning and application, just like the tripartite 
burden-scheme. Further credence to this argument is lent by the fact 
that it is not unheard of for courts to dilute the term “reasonable”; 
indeed, as already noted, courts have a history of doing so. 
Post-Adams cases have not relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s 
ADEA/Equal Pay Act analogy to lessen an employer’s burden of 
proof.94 That analogy, however, is nevertheless troubling because it 
illustrates judges’ willingness to dilute the reasonable factors 
exception through means other than the application of Title VII 
burden-shifting; instead of using that burden-shifting scheme, the 
Eleventh Circuit noted that the term “reasonable,” as used in the 
ADEA’s reasonable factors exception, has potentially less meaning 
than the plain language of that term suggests. The fact that that 
interpretation has not yet been applied in other cases does not lessen 
its import as an indicator of judicial willingness to marginalize that 
term. As noted in the following section, there are significant 
problems with limiting the reasonable factors exception by any 
method: first, the application of Title VII burden-shifting to the 
ADEA rests on unsound analysis; and second, diluting the 
reasonability requirement would severely handicap future disparate 
treatment plaintiffs—a result that flies in the face of Congress’s 
intent in passing the ADEA. This section will address those points in 
turn. 
C. Problems with Diluting the Reasonability Requirement 
1. The reasoning behind applying Title VII burden-shifting is unsound 
The reasoning behind applying Title VII burden-shifting is 
susceptible to criticism. That scheme originated in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green,95 which found that, in a Title VII claim, a 
defendant may rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a 
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the defendant’s action.96 
Later, several circuit court cases held that McDonnell Douglas’s Title 
 94. Eleventh Circuit cases have instead continued to apply Title VII burden-shifting in 
ADEA cases. See Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 95. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 96. Id. at 802. 
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VII burden-shifting rule was applicable in ADEA contexts.97 Then, in 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 98 the Supreme Court 
applied Title VII burden-shifting to decide an ADEA case.99 
Numerous cases have relied on Reeves as a justification for applying 
Title VII burden shifting to ADEA cases,100 but it should be noted, 
however, that in Reeves, the Supreme Court assumed without 
deciding that the burden-shifting rule in McDonnell Douglas applies 
to ADEA cases because the parties did not dispute the issue.101 
Indeed, in that case, the Court was not called upon to determine the 
applicability of the McDonnell Douglas test to the ADEA.102 The 
Court never considered the legal merits of such an application. 
Moreover, a Title VII burden-shifting analysis is simply not 
transferable to the ADEA; the provision on which an employer’s 
burden of proof should turn in an ADEA case—“reasonable factors 
other than age”—does not exist in Title VII.103 The plain language of 
the ADEA requires a defendant employer to present evidence of 
reasonable factors other than age; because Title VII has no similar 
provision, the burden-shifting scheme employed in those cases does 
not result in the harm that it does in ADEA cases because Title VII 
provides no statutorily-defined standard that a defendant employer 
must meet in making its defense. 
There is no need to criticize the Supreme Court’s Reeves 
decision; the Court decided only the issue before it and made an 
inference, without deciding, to which the parties implicitly 
consented. The decisions deserving criticism were made by the 
circuit courts that view Reeves as giving legitimacy to a practice that 
 97. See, e.g., Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 98. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 99. Id. at 141–42. 
 100. See supra note 87 for a list of cases relying on Reeves to justify using the Title VII 
burden-shifting scheme to ADEA cases. 
 101. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. 
 102. Id. at 137 (noting that the issue to be resolved was “whether a defendant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff’s case consists exclusively of a prima facie case 
of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant’s 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action”; the issue therefore deals with a 
plaintiff’s burden of proof, not a defendant’s). Note also that in O’Connor v. Consol. Coin 
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996), Justice Scalia wrote that the Court had not yet 
“had occasion to decide whether [the] application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is 
correct.” 
 103. See infra Part V.D. 
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had evidently been in place long before that case was decided.104 
Those decisions have laid the groundwork for virtually every circuit 
to apply Title VII burden shifting in assessing an employer’s rebuttal 
of an ADEA plaintiff’s prima facie case.105
2. Diluting the reasonability requirement would frustrate legitimate 
disparate treatment claims in contravention of congressional intent 
Diluting or removing the reasonability requirement in any case 
would severely handicap future age discrimination plaintiffs from 
recovering under the ADEA. As noted, applying Title VII burden 
shifting to ADEA cases would, in some cases, eliminate the 
requirement that a defendant employer defend its actions by 
presenting evidence of “reasonable factors other than age.”106 In 
those cases, an employer could escape liability simply by raising an 
issue of material fact rather than actually presenting the statutorily-
required reasonable factors. Similarly, under the Eleventh Circuit’s 
view, the term “reasonable” is so diluted that an employer could 
escape liability simply by presenting evidence of “neutral” factors 
other than age.107
It is wise here to make a distinction in order to avoid a fatal 
inconsistency in this Note’s argument. The reasonability required of 
an employer to defend itself against a claim does not bear on the 
kind of harm inflicted upon a plaintiff, but rather upon the level of 
proof the employer must submit to justify its actions. As such, any 
harm resulting from the dilution of the ADEA’s reasonability 
requirement, whether that dilution is a result of the improper 
application of Title VII burden shifting or an improper analogy, falls 
on those claiming disparate treatment, not disparate impact, as the 
basis for their claim, for, as already noted, the ADEA does not 
recognize disparate impact. This distinction is necessary to avoid the 
obvious inconsistency of first arguing that the ADEA precludes 
 104. See, e.g., Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 105. See supra note 87. 
 106. See supra Part IV.A. 
 107. For an example of how the Court’s Reeves decision has been misinterpreted and 
used to complicate plaintiffs’ ADEA recovery potential, see Reeves Doesn’t Help Former 
Employee’s ADEA Case, 17 No. 18 EMPLOYMENT ALERT at 8 (2000). 
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disparate impact, and in turn arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision unfairly limits plaintiffs’ recourse for age discrimination.108
Making it more difficult for disparate treatment plaintiffs to 
prevail is inconsistent with the congressionally-stated purpose of the 
ADEA. Congress intended that Act “to promote employment of 
older persons based on their ability rather than age” and “to prohibit 
arbitrary age discrimination in employment.”109 In so stating, 
Congress clearly intended to allow liability for the disparate 
treatment of workers based on age.110 That is the rule Congress set 
forth, and it is subject only to the exclusion of disparate impact, 
defined as behavior motivated by “reasonable factors other than 
age.” Any dilution or elimination of the term “reasonable,” as used 
in the ADEA, therefore flies in the face of this goal. Such a dilution 
would lower the standard that an allegedly infringing employer 
would have to meet to justify its actions, making it easier for that 
employer to escape the very liability Congress intended to impose on 
discriminating employers. 
V. THE ANALYSIS THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED 
The Eleventh Circuit could have avoided participating in the 
trend to dilute the reasonable factors exception by relying on the 
plain language of the ADEA. This section will first make the plain 
language argument that the court should have made. It will then 
demonstrate that that analysis is consistent with Supreme Court 
statements on the issue, the ADEA’s legislative history, and the 
Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to analogize between Title VII and the 
ADEA. 
A. The Plain Language of the ADEA 
The main point of contention in interpreting the plain language 
of the ADEA lies in section 623(f)(1), which permits otherwise 
discriminatory behavior if (1) “age is a bona fide occupational 
 108. It must be borne in mind that there are two kinds of age discrimination plaintiffs: 
one whose claims are indeed unfairly affected, and another who never had a claim at all under 
the ADEA. 
 109. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000). 
 110. For a more in-depth treatment of the ADEA’s legislative history and purpose, 
including its distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact liability, see infra 
Part V.C. 
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qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the 
particular business” (the business necessity defense); (2) “where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age”; or (3) 
“where such practices involve an employee in a workplace in a 
foreign country, and compliance [with the Act] would cause such 
employer . . . to violate the laws of the country in which such 
workplace is located.”111 Those that would accept disparate impact in 
ADEA jurisprudence hold that section 623(f)(1) is merely a 
codification of the recognized business necessity defense.112 That 
argument “is based on the premise that Congress did not intend to 
prohibit age discrimination in [section] 623(a) and then approve of 
differentiation on the basis of age in [section] 623(f)(1).”113 Thus, 
those that would admit disparate impact into ADEA jurisprudence 
see the business necessity exception as swallowing the reasonable 
factors exception, indeed, making all three exceptions “bona fide 
occupational qualification[s] reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the particular business”114 and giving the “reasonable 
factors” exception no meaning independent from the business 
necessity exception. 
That interpretation, however, does not stand up to accepted 
standards of statutory interpretation. Indeed, it is well recognized 
 111. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). 
 112. The concurrence in Adams is an example of this. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 
F.3d 1322, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., concurring) (“Section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA 
should not be interpreted as anything more than a statutory description of the business 
necessity defense.”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Francis W. Parker 
Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems clear . . . that 
§ 4(f)(1) simply codifies the business necessity defense.”). 
Judge Cudahy’s dissent in Francis W. Parker School is probably the seminal argument for 
holding that section 623(f)(1) simply codifies the business necessity defense. See Nathan E. 
Holmes, Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Are Disparate Impact 
Claims Available?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 311–13, 323–25 (2000) (analyzing Judge 
Cudahy’s dissent); Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument 
Against Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 625, 641 (1996) (noting Judge Cudahy’s dissent); Jacob N. Lesser, Note, No ADEA 
Liability for Employment Decisions Based on Nonpretextual Factors Closely Correlated with Age: 
EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 37 B.C. L. REV. 374, 380–81 (1996); Brendan Sweeney, 
Comment, “Downsizing” the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Availability of 
Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1527, 1566 (1996). 
 113. Sweeney, supra note 112, at 1548. 
 114. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). 
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that statutes ought to be construed so as to eliminate superfluities.115 
Moreover, “when ‘two words or expressions are coupled together, 
one of which generically includes the other, it is obvious that the 
more general term is used in a meaning excluding the specific 
one.’”116 With respect to the ADEA, therefore, the reasonable factors 
and the foreign law exceptions simply cannot be mere incarnations 
or examples of the business necessity defense; if they were, they 
would be superfluous. Indeed, the general term or expression—in 
this case, the business necessity defense—must be assigned a 
meaning that excludes the other two exceptions. Moreover, to avoid 
further superfluity, the reasonable factors exception must be 
interpreted so as to be distinct from the foreign law exception. 
Therefore, all three exceptions must be distinct and independent 
from one another. 
That the business necessity and reasonable factors exceptions are 
distinguishable is borne out by the text of the provision. Section 
623(f)(1) holds that discriminatory action is excusable if (a) it is 
based on “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of the particular business”; or (b) “where 
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.”117 
In other words, the business necessity exception is invoked when age 
is a determining factor in the employer’s allegedly discriminatory 
action, but the reasonable factors exception is invoked where age is 
not a determining factor in the employment practice.118
Given that the three exceptions listed in section 623(f)(1) must 
be construed so as to be distinct and independent from one another, 
the reasonable factors exception must be construed according to its 
plain language and not in relation to the other two exceptions. The 
plain language—that otherwise discriminatory behavior is acceptable 
 115. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of 
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can 
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”) 
(quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
 116. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 445 
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 266, at 349 (1891)). 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). 
 118. See also Querry, supra note 56, at 578–79 (noting that the business necessity defense 
is incompatible with the ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than age” exception because the 
business necessity defense requires a showing of necessity, while the “reasonable factors” test 
requires only a showing of reasonableness). 
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“where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than 
age”—is synonymous with the definition of disparate impact already 
given in this Note: “employment practices that are facially neutral in 
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly 
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business 
necessity.”119 Indeed, a practice cannot be neutral on its face unless it 
is based on “reasonable factors other than age.” The “reasonable 
factors” exception is therefore a plain language preclusion of 
disparate impact from the ADEA.120
This plain language argument achieves what the Adams majority 
set out to do: hold that the ADEA precludes disparate impact 
liability. It does so without lowering defendant employers’ burden of 
proof. As demonstrated in the following sections, this analysis is 
consistent with the correct points of the Adams rationale. While the 
Supreme Court has not issued any statements of precedential weight 
on whether disparate impact is a cognizable injury under the ADEA, 
and the Eleventh Circuit was therefore incorrect in relying on those 
statements as if they had such weight, those statements do indicate 
the Court’s inclination to preclude disparate impact from ADEA 
jurisprudence. Also, the plain language analysis presented in this 
Note is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s contentions that 
allowing the ADEA to recognize disparate impact runs contrary to 
 119. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Note that 
the definition of disparate impact from Teamsters adds the requirement that the practice 
“cannot be justified by business necessity.” This construction makes the facial neutrality of the 
practice subordinate to business necessity. In other words, even if the practice is facially 
neutral, it still produces a disparate impact if it cannot be justified as a business necessity. This, 
at first, seems to contradict this Note’s previous conclusion that section 623(f)(1)’s reasonable 
factors exception was distinct and independent from the business necessity defense, given that 
the section 623(f)(1) reasonable factors exception and the Teamsters definition are one and the 
same. It must be borne in mind, though, that Teamsters is a Title VII case, not an ADEA case. 
While Teamsters provides a useful, general definition of disparate impact, Title VII does not 
contain a “reasonable factors other than age” exception to its prohibitions. See infra Part V.D. 
As such, the fact that the Teamsters definition subordinates a practice’s facial neutrality to 
business necessity is irrelevant in the present case. See Holmes, supra note 112, at 325 (“There 
is no good reason to equate the burden of showing that a decision was reasonable, with that of 
establishing that the decision was a necessity.”). 
 120. For other opinions on why the ADEA should be interpreted to preclude disparate 
impact claims, see Herbert & Shelton, supra note 112, at 650–60 (arguing that allowing 
disparate impact claims under the ADEA would impermissibly produce jury trials of 
complicated statistical issues); Sweeney, supra note 112, at 1533–34 (concluding that the 
ADEA precludes disparate impact liability but that the ADEA should be amended to include 
disparate impact). 
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Congress’s intent and that Title VII and the ADEA are really not 
analogous. In short, then, if the Eleventh Circuit had relied on this 
plain language analysis, it could have retained these valid and true 
points while avoiding participation in a trend that is damaging to 
future disparate treatment plaintiffs. 
B. Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court has commented on whether the ADEA 
permits disparate impact claims. Those statements come in the form 
of concurring and dissenting opinions that obviously have no 
precedential value. Those statements uniformly hold that the ADEA 
does not permit disparate impact claims, and therefore reinforce the 
plain language argument made in the preceding section. 
In 1981, Justice Rehnquist vigorously dissented from the 
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Markham v. Geller, an appeal 
from the Second Circuit.121 That case dealt with a fifty-five-year-old 
teacher with thirteen years of teaching experience who was denied a 
job in favor of a twenty-six-year-old teacher with three years of 
experience. The offending school board had enacted a policy of only 
recruiting teachers who would be paid below the “sixth step” on the 
district’s pay scale, thus precluding the hiring of any teachers with 
more than five years of experience.122 The Court of Appeals found in 
favor of the fifty-five-year-old teacher on the ground that there had 
not been a sufficient showing of business necessity and that the 
district’s budgetary policy had an unfair, disproportionate impact on 
teachers between the ages of forty and sixty-five.123 In arguing that 
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to reverse the Court of 
Appeals’ erroneous holding, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court 
[had] never held that proof of discriminatory impact can establish a 
violation of the ADEA, and it certainly has never sanctioned a 
finding of a violation where the statistical evidence revealed that a 
policy, neutral on its face, has such a significant impact on all 
candidates concerned, not simply the protected age group.124
 121. 451 U.S. 945 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 945–46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 946–48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, Justice Rehnquist argued that the section 623(f)(1) 
language allowing apparently discriminatory action “where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age” 
indicates a Congressional intent to exclude disparate impact from 
ADEA jurisprudence.125
The majority in the Hazen Paper decision also weighed in on the 
issue of whether disparate impact liability is permissible under the 
ADEA. It noted that “[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the essence 
of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the very 
essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired 
because the employer believes that productivity and competence 
decline with old age.”126 Also, the majority explained that “Congress’ 
promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its concern that older 
workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of 
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes.”127 Therefore, “[w]hen the 
employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age, 
the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes 
disappears.”128 Justice Kennedy, along with the Chief Justice and 
Justice Thomas, concurred in the Hazen Paper decision. In that 
concurrence, those Justices noted that “there are substantial 
arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis 
from Title VII to the ADEA.”129  
Though not binding as precedent,130 these statements bring to 
light key arguments against allowing disparate impact claims under 
 125. Id. at 948–49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2000)). 
 126. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 611. 
 129. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Several cases rely on these dissenting and 
concurring opinions to support the proposition that disparate impact cannot form a basis for 
liability under the ADEA. See Evans v. Atwood, 38 F. Supp. 2d 25, 30 (D.D.C. 1999); Hyman 
v. First Union Corp., 980 F. Supp. 38, 40–41 (D.D.C. 1997); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 
959 F. Supp. 742, 746 (E.D. Va. 1997); Lumpkin v. Brown, 898 F. Supp. 1263, 1270 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995) (referring to Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari 
in Markham v. Geller). 
 130. These statements, though helpful in determining how at least a few members of the 
Supreme Court would hold if presented with the Adams case, are not binding as precedent; 
reliance on these statements as anything more than an indication of the Court’s leanings or a 
presentation of well-reasoned counterarguments is therefore inappropriate. The precedential 
weight of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent may be disposed of quickly, for it is common knowledge 
that dissenting opinions carry no precedential weight. Mark C. Rahdert, Sprague v. Casey and 
its Seven Deadly Sins, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 625, 635–36 (1989) (“First year law students are 
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the ADEA. Though the Adams court was incorrect in relying on 
these statements as precedent, it correctly noted that the Supreme 
Court, if given the chance, is likely inclined to hold that disparate 
impact has no place in ADEA jurisprudence. Relying on a plain 
language argument to interpret the ADEA, as the Eleventh Circuit 
should have done, would have been entirely consistent with these 
statements, and would have allowed the Eleventh Circuit to reach 
the same result without reducing a defendant employer’s burden of 
rebuttal. 
C. Analysis of Congress’s Intent in Enacting the ADEA 
The Supreme Court has noted that statutory language is 
conclusive “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the 
contrary.”131 In other words, if Congress has expressed an intention, 
that intention must govern any interpretation of a statute’s plain 
language. This rule of statutory construction seems to fly in the face 
of the preceding analysis of the ADEA’s language because in its 
taught as one of their earliest lessons that dissenting opinions are not controlling authority for 
anything.”). 
Similarly, concurring opinions should only be granted precedential weight in certain 
situations. Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme 
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1995). A concurrence is a “simple 
concurrence” if it agrees only with the majority’s result, possibly proposing an alternative 
rationale; a concurrence is a “concurrence in judgment” if it agrees with both the majority’s 
result and reasoning. Id. at 2084–85. Concurrences in judgment merit little precedential 
deference. Id. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hazen Paper is likely a concurrence in 
judgment, as it adopts both the majority’s rationale and its conclusion, adding only that 
“nothing in the Court’s opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the so-
called ‘disparate impact’ theory of Title VII.” Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
Finally, the majority’s statements in Hazen Paper should not be accorded precedential 
authority because the majority was deciding a disparate treatment case, not a disparate impact 
case. In his complaint, respondent Biggins “claimed that age had been a determinative factor in 
[the Hazen Paper Company’s] decision to fire him.” Id. at 606. Because his claim 
encompassed only action taken with age as a motivating factor, his claim was one of disparate 
treatment, not disparate impact. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
335 n.15 (1977) (noting that in disparate treatment situations, “[t]he employer simply treats 
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, [or other 
protected characteristics].”) Justice Kennedy conceded this point when he noted that Biggins 
had “advanced no claim that petitioners’ use of an employment practice that has a 
disproportionate effect on older workers violates the ADEA.” Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). As such, the majority’s statements on disparate impact are dicta. 
 131. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (emphasis 
added). 
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statement of findings incident to the purpose of the ADEA, 
Congress noted that “the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of 
potential for job performance has become a common practice, and 
certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of 
older persons.”132 This language seems, at first glance, to invoke the 
commonly accepted definition of disparate impact, which “involve[s] 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of 
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”133 Implicitly, 
then, if Congress noted in its findings of fact that disparate impact 
was prevalent, it must have intended the ADEA to prohibit, rather 
than permit, disparate impact claims. 
The problem with that analysis is that it confuses legislative 
findings and legislative intent. Indeed, “[w]here the language 
Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous,” it is 
presumed “that Congress said what it meant and meant what it 
said.”134 In section 621(b) of the ADEA, Congress stated that the 
ADEA’s purpose was “to promote employment of older persons 
based on their ability rather than age” and “to prohibit arbitrary age 
discrimination in employment.”135 Precluding disparate impact is 
entirely consistent with this purpose. Indeed, the classic disparate 
impact situation—a neutral policy that disproportionately affects 
older workers—likely bears on an employee’s ability rather than age 
and, if based on a standardized policy, is not arbitrary at all. The fact 
that Congress made a finding and excluded it from its statement of 
purpose may even indicate that Congress deliberated on whether to 
allow disparate impact claims, but ultimately decided against it. 
Moreover, the ADEA is the result of a study performed by the 
Secretary of Labor on age discrimination.136 The study distinguished 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 133. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15; Faillace, supra note 26, at 211. 
 134. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). Note the 
distinction between the language of the statute and the language Congress used to express its 
intent in enacting the statute. 
 135. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). 
 136. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229–31 
(1983)  (detailing the production of the Secretary of Labor’s THE OLDER AMERICAN 
WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN 
WORKER] and explaining that “[t]he product of the process of factfinding [sic] and 
deliberation formally begun in 1964 was the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967”); see also Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the 
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between discrimination based on stereotypes (disparate treatment) 
and “problems resulting from factors that ‘affect older workers more 
strongly, as a group, than they do younger employees,’ (disparate 
impact).”137 Based on that distinction, the study suggested that 
Congress prohibit only the former type of discrimination; disparate 
impact was to be resolved through other measures.138 Therefore, 
Congress, basing the ADEA on the Secretary’s report, did not intend 
the ADEA to prohibit disparate impact. The Adams court correctly 
noted that distinction, and the plain language argument presented 
herein is consistent with that policy.139
D. The Inappropriateness of Analogizing Between  
Title VII and the ADEA 
The Adams court also correctly noted that Title VII and the 
ADEA are not analogous because the ADEA allows employers to 
take an otherwise prohibited action so long as that action is “based 
on reasonable factors other than age.”140 Title VII contains no such 
provision.141 To argue that the ADEA should permit disparate impact 
claims because Title VII does so is to ignore this fundamental 
difference in the language of the two provisions. 
Moreover, a comparison between the two provisions misstates 
the real issue. The analogy between Title VII and the ADEA harks 
back to the Supreme Court’s statement in Lorillard v. Pons142 that 
“the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title 
VII.”143 That indeed may be true,144 but whether the ADEA permits 
Secretary’s report “served as a principal impetus for the ADEA”); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 
73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “Congress enacted the ADEA in large 
part” on the Secretary of Labor’s report). 
Note that, “[b]ecause other materials are sparse, discussions of the ADEA’s legislative 
history usually focus on the Secretary’s Report.” Michael C. Sloan, Disparate Impact in the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 507, 512 (1995), cited in Ellis, 73 F.3d 
at 1008. 
 137. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (quoting THE AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 136, at 5, 
11). 
 138. Id. (citing THE AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 136, at 21–25). 
 139. See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 140. Id. at 1325 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)). 
 141. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Title VII 
contains no provision parallel to the ‘reasonable factors other than age’ language in the 
ADEA.”). 
 142. 434 U.S. 575 (1978). 
 143. Id. at 584. 
BRO-FIN 9/29/2003 10:36 PM 
1097] Employer’s Burden of Proof in Age Discrimination Claims 
 1127 
 
disparate impact claims requires an analysis not of the ADEA’s 
prohibitions, but of the exceptions to otherwise prohibited conduct 
listed in section 623(f) of that Act. Indeed, the issue is whether the 
“reasonable factors other than age” exception listed in section 623(f) 
precludes disparate impact suits under the ADEA; that language is 
listed among the exceptions to the ADEA’s general policy of 
prohibiting age discrimination and is not incorporated into any of 
the ADEA’s explicit prohibitions. Logically, that language could not 
rest among the prohibitions, for it speaks to conduct that is 
permitted, not prohibited. Comparing Title VII to the ADEA frames 
the issue as resting with the prohibitions, when the prohibitions are 
not in doubt; it is the exceptions that have given courts the greatest 
headaches. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In deciding Adams v. Florida Power Corp., the Eleventh Circuit 
got the right result in resolving the circuit split—disparate impact is 
not a viable theory of recovery under the ADEA—through the 
wrong analysis. It should have analyzed the ADEA’s plain language, 
which is dispositive, instead of justifying its exclusion of disparate 
impact from the ADEA on the ground that the EPA, rather than 
Title VII, is analogous to the ADEA. By relying on the plain 
language, the court could have avoided participating in a tradition 
that is both poorly reasoned and severely detrimental to future age 
discrimination plaintiffs, while still achieving the same correct result. 











 144. See supra note 12 for a comparison of the prohibitionary language in both 
provisions. 
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